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One of the challenges in analyzing youth 
who participated in the recent Arab upris-
ings relates to explaining and under-
standing their revolutionary practices. 
Adopting a leaderless and cross-ideolog-
ical form of mobilization, youth during 
the eighteen days of the Egyptian upris-
ing managed to practice inclusion by unit-
ing a diverse group of Egyptians. After 
toppling Mubarak, the revolutionary 
youth, however, did not present them-
selves as aiming to seize power, a defin-
ing feature of revolutions at least until the 
1970s. To understand the meaning of 
these new cross-ideological and leader-
less forms of mobilization, I suggest 
understanding youth within their time 
and space. Drawing on Alain Badiou and 
his conception of the intervallic period 
and the rebirth of history through the 
Arab revolts, this article highlights impor-
tant differences among this generation in 
their conception of doing politics. More 
specifically, this paper focuses on the 
changed meaning of the hero figure, 
highlighting the importance of inclusion-
ary politics. It will suggest that since the 
2011 revolutionary event, a shift away 
from traditional politics based on a leader 
and an ideology is being contested for a 
more inclusionary politics as desired by 
the younger generation in Egypt.
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Through the 2011 revolutionary event in 
Egypt, a new political generation of youth 
surfaced. Over just eighteen days, young 
men and women, foremost among other 
participants, took to the streets and top-
pled Egypt’s longtime President Hosni 
Mubarak, whose regime had been in 
power for nearly thirty years. Over the 
course of the uprising, these young 
Egyptians aired a collective frustration 
with deteriorating living conditions and 
advanced a hope for a different type of 
politics and social order capable of achiev-
ing ‘Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice’. 
This generation of young Egyptians - the 
1980s generation - was born in a decid-
edly different historical moment than their 
parents. Arising in the midst of a neolib-
eral world order (Bayat) and during a 
moment marked by an end to classical war 
situations that depended on the soldier 
figure to protect the nation in the name of 
an ideology (Badiou), this generation of 
Egyptian youth grew up in altered times, 
affecting both their transition into adult-
hood and, accordingly, their understand-
ing of what it means to ‘do politics’. 
A number of scholars have highlighted 
the extraordinary nature of Egyptian 
youth’s new political practices, exempli-
fied by the Tahrir experience and the loose 
organizational structures adopted at the 
square, namely its leaderless and cross-
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ideological forms of mobilization (Harders, 
Bamyeh, Hanafi, Herrera et al.). Yet several 
scholars have also emphasized the inabil-
ity of revolutionary youth, through these 
practices, to formulate a new politics capa-
ble of contesting the state (Abdelrahman, 
Rennick). In his analysis, French philoso-
pher Alain Badiou describes the new time 
in which Egypt’s revolutionary youth are 
operating in as an ‘intervallic period’, 
defined by an end to the traditional way of 
doing politics conditioned on a leader 
and an ideology. According to Badiou’s 
reading of the Arab uprisings, “we find 
ourselves in a time of riots1  wherein a 
rebirth of History, as opposed to the pure 
and simple repetition of the worst, is sig-
naled and takes shape” (Badiou 5). 
Following Badiou’s understanding of the 
intervallic period and the rebirth of history 
through the Arab revolts, this paper aims 
to highlight some of the nuances in the 
new political understandings and prac-
tices among Egypt’s revolutionary youth. 
Specifically, it aims to show that, since the 
2011 revolutionary event, Egyptian youth 
have been contesting and shifting away 
from traditional politics based on a leader 
and ideology, towards a decisively differ-
ent, more inclusionary imagination of the 
politics to come. 
After a review of relevant literature and a 
discussion of the intervallic period high-
lighting the different lived experiences 
among youth today, the paper will exam-
ine the cases of Mohamed El-Baradei, one 
of the founders of the Constitution Party, 
and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, one of 
the founders of the Strong Egypt Party, 
through the perspective of youths, to 
highlight how the meaning and role of 
leaders in politics has changed for revolu-
tionary youth. It will highlight the experi-
ences of the 1980s generation by situating 
them within their historical location 
(Mannheim), and instead of defining youth 
by age, it will examine youth as a social 
process based on a historical location. It 
will suggest that while older political activ-
ists played an important role in mobilizing 
for the 2011 events and afterwards, their 
role is now foremost one of symbolic rep-
resentation, rather than as leaders advanc-
ing a particular ideology. Moreover, it will 
argue that revolutionary youth no longer 
want or accept leaders and ideologies in 
their conception of politics, posing both a 
challenge and an opening for a different, 
more emancipatory politics to come.
Youth and the 2011 revolutionary Event 
It came as a surprise to many people in 
Egypt and around the world when young 
Egyptians took to the streets to topple 
President Hosni Mubarak. The possibility 
that this generation, which has been per-
ceived as apathetic and uninterested in 
politics (El-Sharnouby, Murphey, Herrera 
et al.), would take to the streets in such 
great numbers against the thirty-year rule 
of Mubarak was inconceivable before 
2011. Yet, the day after, revolutionary youth 
in Egypt did not manage to entrench 
themselves or their social justice ideals in 
the political system of the state or its for-
mal political institutions. As opposed to 
previous revolutionary movements, 
Egyptian revolutionary youth never sought 
to seize political power to change the sys-
tem from one form to another (Bayat). Yet, 
the 2011 revolutionary event did impact 
youth’s political imaginaries and practices. 
With the revolutionary event and the top-
pling of Mubarak, the question of social 
justice embodied in the slogan ‘Bread, 
Freedom, and Social Justice’ surfaced as 
an important component in the revolu-
tionary imaginary in Egypt. During the 
eighteen days of the uprising, men and 
women united in their diversity at the 
square, allowing for new possibilities of 
social interactions (Bamyeh, Hanafi, 
Badiou). Superseding social divisions dur-
ing the eighteen days, such as between 
Muslims and Christians, men and women, 
and among different classes, new possi-
bilities of collective action and interactions 
were practiced. 
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Revolutionary youth, those young men 
and women who took to the streets and 
still maintain fidelity to the principles of 
the 2011 revolutionary event, have since 
been ruthlessly sidelined, particularly after 
2013 with the return of the military to 
power following the toppling of President 
Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Hamzawy). Finding them-
selves again in the old dynamic of polar-
ized politics between the military and its 
strongest political opposition, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, revolutionary youth are cur-
rently locked in a struggle to impose their 
presence and go beyond the prevailing 
political divisions. While the 2011 event 
brought important questions of social jus-
tice and emancipatory politics to the fore, 
the new political generation forged in the 
event has yet to find a form of organization 
to enact their different political ideals and 
imaginaries. 
In this respect, many scholars have grap-
pled with the meaning of the 2011 revolu-
tionary uprisings in the Arab world and in 
Egypt specifically in its revolutionarity 
and ability to drive change, suggesting 
that revolutionary youth did not have a 
drastically different vision to change the 
socio-political system nor did they aim at 
seizing power (Bayat, Abdelrahman). It is 
particularly the form of organization and 
mobilization characteristic of the 2011 
event—that is, the fact that it was leader-
less and cross-ideological—that gives the 
Egyptian revolution a different appeal 
similar to other revolutionary movements 
in this century. Other examples are the 
Eastern European uprisings at the begin-
ning of the millennium, as well as the 
other uprisings in the Arab world such as 
in Syria and Tunisia. The question thus 
remains: why did this generation of youth 
act differently than previous revolutionary 
movements, and what are the political 
practices and imaginaries that drive their 
political participation? 
To explain the forms of organization 
adopted in Egypt’s 2011 event, some 
scholars have argued for understanding 
them within the larger historical context 
(Zemni et al.). They accordingly suggest 
that similar mobilization strategies were 
adopted from previous political struggles 
in Egypt, most prominently the Kefaya 
(Enough) movement (2004-05) and the 
Baradei campaign for the presidency 
(2010) (Abdelrahman, Rennick, Abdalla). 
Others have argued that these revolts sug-
gest the beginning of a new era that splits 
from old historical legacies, such as by 
proposing an end to post-colonialism 
(Dabashi). Meanwhile, others urge an 
understanding of the Arab revolts not as 
revolutions in the old sense of the word, of 
seizing power, but rather as a combination 
between revolutionary action and calling 
for reforms. In this context, Asef Bayat 
refers to the 2011 uprising as a ‘Refolution’ 
(Bayat). 
Bayat claims that revolutions mean simply 
“the rapid and radical transformation of a 
state driven by popular movements from 
below” (Bayat 154). This definition has 
been expanded since the Arab uprisings 
in a way that not only focuses on the results 
of the uprisings in terms of state transfor-
mations, but also pays attention to the 
unfolding changes among revolutionar-
ies. According to Brecht de Smet, “an out-
come-centered or consequent centralist 
approach turns a particular outcome of 
the revolutionary process into a primary 
determinant of its success - i.e. the con-
quest, break-up, and transformation of 
states” (De Smet). Similarly, Mohammed 
Bamyeh emphasizes that  
successful revolutions are those that 
usher in a legacy of cultural transforma-
tion, and not those that topple systems 
of grievance. In this sense, enlighten-
ment and revolution go hand in hand, 
but only insofar as the revolution does 
away not simply with a political regime 
as much as with vestiges of authoritari-
an culture in society at large (Bamyeh 
32). 
Many of these scholars have thus 
understood the 2011 revolution as a con-
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tinuous or even permanent revolution 
(Abdelrahman, De Smet), based on a long 
process of contentious struggle. In that 
sense, “the revolutionary process is 
stretched in time, and its movements are 
dictated by the ebb and flow of its consti-
tuting and profound political and eco-
nomic protests” (Zemni et al.). In a similar 
understanding, the Egyptian revolutionary 
uprising is understood in this paper as a 
long process, yet conditioned by the sur-
facing of something new through the 
appearance of, drawing from Badiou’s ter-
minology, the event and the subject. 
In Badiou’s theoretical framework, an 
event is understood as a break in time 
through which a new collective political 
subject emerges. For Badiou, the experi-
ence of the event carries in itself clues in 
which new possibilities for change are 
embedded. Meaning comes when the 
newly forged political subject attempts to 
organize itself in fidelity to the event: 
A political organization is the Subject 
of a discipline of the event, an order 
in the service of disorder, the constant 
guardianship of an exception (Badiou 
66). 
Thus, understanding the new political 
practices that are characteristic of the 2011 
event in Egypt should not seek to simply 
explain from where these modes of orga-
nization may have been adopted histori-
cally, but should also explore them in rela-
tion to what type of new political subject 
surfaced in the event. 
Understanding and analyzing the mean-
ing of the loose organizational structures 
thus requires juxtaposing the political 
subject(s) that surfaced from the event, 
including their political practices and 
imaginaries, with the historical moment in 
which the Egyptian uprising appeared, 
which Badiou has coined an “intervallic 
period”. In his book The Rebirth of History, 
Badiou defines an intervallic period as
what comes after2 a period in which 
the revolutionary conception of politi-
cal action has been sufficiently clarified 
that, notwithstanding the ferocious in-
ternal struggles punctuating its deve-
lopment, it is explicitly presented as an 
alternative to the dominant world, and 
on this basis has secured massive, dis-
ciplined support. (Badiou 38-9)
The disciplined support for the revolution-
ary ideals of social justice imagined 
through a diverse collective gave the revo-
lutionary masses in Egypt clues in terms of 
what they reject, namely discrimination, 
exclusion of women and minorities (such 
Christians and Nubians), unequal power-
sharing, and an unfair distribution of 
resources. Yet these ideals have not yet 
been embedded into structural possibili-
ties in an organized politics. These nega-
tive ideals, which Egypt’s revolutionary 
youth reject, are still in search of an ‘affir-
mative element of the idea’:
During these intervallic periods, howe-
ver, discontent, rebellion and the con-
viction that the world should not be as 
it is (…) all this exists. At the same time, 
it cannot find its political form, in the 
first instance because it cannot draw 
strength from the sharing of an Idea. 
The force of rebellions, even when 
they assume an historical significance, 
remains essentially negative (‘let them 
go’, ‘Ben Ali out’, ‘Mubarak clear off’). It 
does not deploy a slogan in the affir-
mative element of the Idea. (Badiou 40)
As Badiou explains, the formulation of an 
affirmative idea is essential for inaugurat-
ing a new form of politics beyond the 
intervallic period.
In short, guardians of the history of 
emancipation in an intervallic period, 
historical riots point to the urgency of 
a reformulated ideological proposal, a 
powerful Idea, a pivotal hypothesis, so 
that the energy they release and the in-
dividuals they engage can give rise, in 
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and beyond the mass movement and 
the reawakening of History it signals, to 
a new figure of organization and hence 
of politics. (Badiou 42)
Analyzing revolutionary youth’s ongoing 
political struggles in the context of an 
intervallic period highlights the political 
subjects’ search for a new affirmative idea 
for the politics to come. As of now, the 
new politics of Egyptian revolutionary 
youth is defined on greater social justice 
and organized around the importance of 
inclusion of the different segments of 
society which unfolds in practice by the 
rejection of a leadership figure in the 
sense of a hero that strives for change in 
the name of an ideology. 
In absence of an ideology and leader, the 
challenge for Egypt’s revolutionary youth 
is to find an adequate, alternative form of 
organization for enacting their political 
imaginary in fidelity to the 2011 event. 
Juxtaposing the political figures of Baradei 
and Aboul Fotouh demonstrates some of 
the contradictions in the political party as 
a form of organization and the difficulty of 
searching for meaningful forms of organi-
zation in the absence of a hero figure and 
an idea. As becomes clear from these con-
tradictions, the party system, as it currently 
exists, does not offer revolutionary youth 
the organizational structure upon which a 
new form of politics can be born. 
The challenge of the cross-ideological 
and leaderless forms of mobilization is 
then precisely to find a new form of poli-
tics, an idea, and a new type of leadership 
to organize the revolutionary masses in 
meaningful ways; that is, in light of the 
clues that surfaced with the event, the 
importance of social justice imagined 
through a diverse collective, that of men 
and women, Christians and Muslims, peo-
ple of different classes, and so on. In his 
book, Philosophy for Militants, Badiou 
argues and asks  
‘The last man’ is the exhausted figure 
of a man devoid of any figure. It is the 
nihilistic image of the fixed nature of 
the human animal, devoid of all crea-
tive possibility of overcoming. Our task 
is to find a new heroic figure, which is 
neither the return of the old figure of 
religious or national sacrifice nor the 
nihilistic figure of the last man. Is the-
re a place, in a disoriented world, for a 
new style of heroism? (Badiou 34)
The search for a new ‘style of heroism’ to 
fuel the energies of revolutionaries to con-
tinue their struggle for emancipatory poli-
tics is far from easy, precisely because the 
old hero figures are not representative of 
the historical moment in which the upris-
ing unfolded. According to Badiou “the 
period of the aristocratic warrior is behind 
us, as is the period of the democratic sol-
dier. So much is certain, but we do not find 
ourselves for this reason at the peaceful 
end of History” (Badiou 44). He further 
states that 
the great problem is to create a para-
digm of heroism beyond war, a figure 
that would be neither that of the war-
rior nor that of the soldier, without for 
this reason returning to Christian paci-
fism, which is only the passive form of 
sacrifice (Badiou 35). 
This soldier figure to Badiou was con-
nected to the war situation. The transition 
from the warrior to the soldier figure came 
with the French Revolution, in which the 
soldier figure represents a collective while 
the warrior before that was foremost 
important in his individual achievements. 
The warrior figure “does not formalize a 
disciplined relationship to an idea. It is a 
figure of self-affirmation, the promotion of 
a visible superiority” (ibid 35). Thus, to 
Badiou, “the French Revolution replaced 
the individual and aristocratic figure of the 
warrior with the democratic and collective 
figure of the soldier” (Badiou  35).
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Being 79 years old himself, Badiou’s focus 
on the experience of today’s youth in his 
most recent book, The True Life, suggests 
that youth find themselves in disoriented 
times in search of new ways of socializa-
tion and identification. In the past, for 
example, “a young man was considered 
an adult when he had done his military 
service, and a young woman was consid-
ered an adult when she got married. 
Today, these two vestiges of initiation are 
no more than memories for grandparents” 
(Badiou 18). Another decisive difference 
for Badiou is that “in traditional society, the 
elders were always the ones in charge; 
they were valued as such, naturally to the 
detriment of the young people. Wisdom 
was on the side of long experience, 
advanced age, old age” (ibid 19). Although 
Badiou reflects here foremost on French 
society, there is some truth to these shifts 
in Egypt too. Young people’s socialization 
process is shifting away from a traditional 
society with clearly defined roles for men 
and women, leadership, and ideology. 
Though still a patriarchal society, the 2011 
revolutionary event in Egypt inaugurated 
a new process of shifting in the role of 
women as well as the importance of 
elders, particularly imagined as heroes. 
Badiou’s understanding of the confusion 
in the world today in terms of revolution-
ary politics is convincing. According to 
Badiou, “classical revolutionary politics 
whose goal is justice” reached an end at 
the close of the 1970s, yet there is no 
beginning to something new, a new name, 
idea, or figure to hold on to. Accordingly, 
he suggests understanding this time, both 
globally and in the context of Egypt, as 
intervallic, that is, a moment in which it is 
clear that something has to change, but no 
idea is yet strong enough to unify the rev-
olutionary youth towards something other 
than the vague dream of social justice. 
According to Badiou:
In an intervallic period, […] the revolu-
tionary idea of the preceding period, 
which naturally encountered formidab-
le obstacles, relentless enemies without 
and a provisional inability to resolve 
important problems within is dormant. 
It has not yet been taken up by a new 
sequence in its development. An open, 
shared and universally practicable fi-
gure of emancipation is wanting. The 
historical time is defined, at least for all 
those unamenable to selling out to do-
mination, by a sort of uncertain interval 
of the Idea. (Badiou 38-39) 
Youth of today are born in drastically dif-
ferent times from previous generations, 
with different experiences affecting their 
political imaginaries. Asef Bayat, in that 
sense, identifies the year 1979-80 as the 
point in which neoliberalism was advanced 
and “played a central role in [the] change 
of the discourse. In place of ‘state’ and 
‘revolution’ there was an exponential 
growth of talk about NGOs, ‘civil society’, 
public spheres’ and so forth – in a word, 
reform” (Bayat 56). The effect of the neo-
liberal order on the transition of youth 
from childhood to adolescence has been 
highlighted by some scholars in that neo-
liberal ideas and ideologies are increas-
ingly fused with the image of youth, with 
an aim to “inculcate neoliberal subjectivi-
ties among the young through education, 
training and youth development pro-
grams that promote such concepts as 
youth entrepreneurship and financial lit-
eracy” (Sukarieh et al. 24). As a result, 
young people spend more time in their 
lives on education and training. According 
to Wyn and White, 
young people are often forced to seek 
refuge in education and training insti-
tutions because they cannot find work 
(Wyn et al. 2). 
Vera King suggests that youth also experi-
ence time differently. Acceleration of time 
has a decisive impact on youth in as far as 
new burdens and pressures are imposed 
on them (King). According to Linda 
Herrera, another trend among youth due 
to neoliberal economic restructuring is 
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widespread precarity. Critiquing the UN’s 
2016 Arab Human Development Report, 
she states 
The message to young people is that 
they should pull themselves together, 
become more self-reliant and take 
charge of their lives. This distorted 
framing of empowerment advances a 
development model in which young 
people are encouraged to break their 
collective bonds as “youth” in ex-
change for facing the future as compe-
ting individuals (Herrera). 
Youth in general, and Egyptian youth in 
specific, thus find themselves in a deci-
sively different moment in time marked by 
the revolutionary event. Due to the event, 
important questions and reflections in 
relation to social justice are unfolding until 
this day. What will follow is an examination 
of the changed meaning of the hero figure 
to revolutionary youth through fieldwork 
done in Egypt in 2014 and 2015.
Superseding one coherent Unity through 
a Desire for Inclusion in Diversity 
Based on interviews with young former 
party members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and members of the Constitution Party,3 
the following examination of two political 
party figures, Baradei and Aboul Fotouh, 
highlights the changed meaning of the 
hero figure in the context of the Egyptian 
uprising in 2011. 
The Absence of a Hero Figure 
The mobilization for the Egyptian revolu-
tion, though in absence of a hero figure, 
had certain political figures that made it 
possible for the movement to unfold into 
a historical riot4 in 2011. For example, 
Mohamed El Baradei, former director 
general of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and Nobel Peace Prize winner in 
2005, undoubtedly played an important 
role in uniting the opposition when he 
proposed running against President Hosni 
Mubarak in what should have been the 
2011 presidential elections. Yet, looking 
closely at what Baradei stood for in terms 
of leadership, he did not embody a heroic 
figure as such, with a new agenda for 
bringing about change. 
According to Amina,5 a member of the 
Constitution Party that was formed by 
Baradei and others, “Baradei is like 
Ghandi. He is important as an iconic fig-
ure” (Personal Interview). Amina, who 
joined the Baradei campaign for the pres-
idency in 2010, explained that young peo-
ple were shocked when Baradei eventu-
ally decided not to run for the presidency, 
but noted that 
he taught them that this movement is 
not and shall not depend on him (Per-
sonal Interview).
Amina believes “we are the children of 
Baradei. He taught us that he is not a god-
father and that we have to work ourselves” 
(Personal Interview). 
For Amina, Baradei’s Constitution Party is 
important foremost in protecting youth 
from detention. Other than that, the party 
does not seem to offer much, in her opin-
ion. She believes that 
revolutionary consciousness (w’y thaw-
ry) is about doing something for the 
country without waiting for a result, 
while ‘political consciousness’ (w’y 
syasy) is about aiming to gain power. 
The process of political thinking aims 
at quick solutions, while revolutionary 
thought is patient in the long run (Per-
sonal Interview). 
Though affected by Baradei, Amina is 
more interested in political practices, in 
which she imagines revolutionary politics 
to be about a long process that aims even-
tually towards a politics of greater social 
justice. For her, political participation is 
clearly not about gaining power, as she 
learned from Baradei. Baradei, in that 
sense, did not resemble the traditional 
hero figure in terms of following his ideas, 
but rather following his lead in an aim to 
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reform the state in accordance with demo-
cratic forms of governance.
Amr, a member in the 6th of April youth 
movement who joined the Constitution 
Party, but who was not very active, had a 
similar understanding of Baradei as 
Ghandi. For him, “Baradei, like Ghandi, is 
the father figure that inspired and made 
me join the Constitution Party”. Besides 
being an inspiration, however, the party 
did not represent much more for Amr in 
terms of a form of organization that could 
bring about meaningful change. The 
image that Baradei represents fits well in 
the current historical situation in which 
there is a general absence of the tradi-
tional hero figure. Baradei primarily repre-
sents a leading figure who encourages the 
young to participate in politics through 
democratic forms of governance, such as 
elections. He does not represent a hero 
figure in the old sense of the word.
What Baradei resembled is thus the pos-
sibility for democracy in the absence of 
anything revolutionary about him in terms 
of representing an ideology. He repre-
sented the possibility of democratic gov-
ernance by proposing to compete in the 
elections; in a broader sense, Baradei 
embodied the possibility of meaningful 
reforms of the state and its institutions by 
breaking the domination of the presi-
dency by one dictator after the next. 
Baradei also symbolized the will to go 
against acting as a hero figure. Instead, he 
explicitly sought to serve as a focal point, 
using the wide network that his advanced 
age and prestige afforded him to mobi-
lize youth. He did not consider himself a 
hero, as Amina suggests, nor did he aim 
to bring about drastic change. Rather, he 
sought to motivate the youth to join forces 
and push for the changes they hoped for, 
leading some members in the Constitution 
Party to perceive him as a ‘Ghandi’ figure 
in the sense of standing for peaceful resis-
tance combined with an image of push-
ing for reforms.
Similar trends can be found among youth 
who were formerly members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in the 
1920s, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
espouses an Islamic ideology and has an 
extensive history of mobilization and orga-
nization that has long established it as the 
strongest opposition in Egypt. Having 
acted as the opposition for an extended 
period of time, the MB developed into a 
centralized leadership and rigid hierarchy, 
which was less appealing to some of its 
young members. According to Akram, 
who is 30 years old and was a MB member 
from 2003 to 2008
When the MB started their first year of 
rule [in 2012], they had some important 
challenges in their organization, like 
the problem of recruitment. They really 
did not manage to recruit. And this was 
something fascinating for anyone who 
knows them because in the past they 
recruited members in huge numbers. 
Their appeal [once they were in power] 
was not there anymore – they used to 
present themselves as a moderate mo-
vement that fights. But now that they 
are in power, the appeal of what you 
had as an opposition was gone”.  (Per-
sonal Interview). 
Akram, whose family has been in the 
higher ranks of the MB in previous years, 
decided to resign from the organization in 
frustration with the Islamic interpretations 
the movement adopted and its inability to 
open up to new ideas in its rigid organiza-
tional structure. According to him
The organization of the MB, what keeps 
it together during times of repression 
is based on central democracy. The 
decision-making always happens on a 
very small scale and very centralized, 
and then the implementation of these 
decisions happens also in a very cen-
tralized way. (…) The organization does 
not want people who think. It is not 
only that they do not want them [those 
who aim to introduce new ideas], but 
they become a burden – people they 
[the MB] do not want. And this explains 
why many people have left. (Personal 
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Interview)
Ahmed, who was a MB member from 1995 
to 2009, confirmed this sentiment. Ahmed 
resigned in 2009 because
I personally felt that the solution [to po-
litical change] had to be a revolutiona-
ry one, which I realized in 2009 when 
the constitution of 2007 was adjusted 
and the heritage [Hosni Mubarak be-
gan grooming his son Gamal Mubarak 
to become the next president of Egypt] 
started happening and so on. The MB 
did not go into this direction, while in 
the meantime, there appeared more 
youth movements and there were al-
ternatives to the MB who fight the po-
litical order in a more revolutionary di-
rection. (Personal Interview)
After the 2011 revolutionary uprising, 
Ahmed reconsidered joining the MB, but 
the centralized decision-making process 
and control over youth’s choices was 
unappealing. Shortly after Mubarak was 
toppled in 2011, some youth of the MB 
got permission [from the MB leader-
ship] to make a conference. Yet shortly 
before the conference they were told 
to cancel it. So they [the youth] wonde-
red why, we have already reserved a 
place and made other arrangements. 
No, cancel it [they were told]. The idea 
that youth make their own conference 
and talk openly about their issues was 
considered not feasible, instead they 
[the MB leadership] wanted them [the 
youth] to talk to the leaders as their 
friends. Eventually the MB said we have 
nothing to do with this conference. But 
they [the youth] insisted to hold the 
conference, which of course marked 
them. When the decision was taken [to 
do the conference] they [those orga-
nizing the conference] were expelled. 
(Personal Interview)
Ahmed, along with several other former 
MB members who had all joined the 
Baradei campaign for presidency in 2010, 
eventually decided to form their own 
group/party. For this, they decided they 
needed a ‘famous person’:
Some of us thought, let’s make a party, 
and then the idea was, despite whether 
it was right or wrong, how do we form 
the party?! We need a famous person to 
attract people. Then, what about Aboul 
Fotouh? He was the suggestion as a fa-
mous person among the doctors. And 
we were close to him, so we thought, 
why not make him the president of the 
party? And then others would say, why 
not do a presidential campaign? The 
idea being to do a presidential cam-
paign to attract people and mobilize 
them and then, out of it, make a party, 
because you need 10,000 official sup-
porters in a number of governorates 
and so on [to form a political party]. 
So then we started talking to him and 
decided to do a presidential campaign 
and not a party. (Personal Interview)
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, presidential 
hopeful in the 2012 elections and ex-MB 
member, though still influential among 
the MB and famous among its youth mem-
bers, also did not resemble a traditional 
hero figure. Instead, he served as an 
important iconic figure that helped to 
mobilize youth groups. The Strong Egypt 
Party, formed by Aboul Fotouh, is an inter-
esting case study for deeper probing, par-
ticularly in its ideological component, in as 
far as Aboul Fotouh appeared as a moder-
ate Islamist, thus attracting attention on 
this ideological level. Yet, in terms of lead-
ership in the sense of a classic hero figure 
that finds relevance and strength through 
ideology, he also did not fit the bill. That is, 
Aboul Fotouh foremost resembled a pos-
sibility for moderate Islamism; in a sense, 
he offered a way out of the centralized and 
rigid interpretations of Islam by the MB. 
Although the case of MB splinter groups 
needs deeper probing in terms of their 
political imaginaries due to the complex 
relationship between Islam and politics in 
the Egyptian context, the political imagi-
naries among revolutionary youth, includ-
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ing those who left the MB, is not based on 
a search for a hero figure and a rigid ideol-
ogy to follow. While this revolutionary 
movement in Egypt, similar to previous 
revolutionary movements, aimed to 
achieve greater social justice, a decisive 
difference is the absence of a political 
drive based on a hero figure mobilizing 
people in the name of an ideology. The 
political figures of Baradei and Aboul 
Fotouh resemble important iconic figures 
used to form groups, yet they do not 
resemble the hero figure in the Badiouan 
sense.
Contrasting the political figure of Baradei 
to that of Gamal Abdel Nasser, for exam-
ple, illustrates the different character of 
the 2011 revolution versus the 1952 revolu-
tionary coup in Egypt. Nasser represented 
a hero figure in the Badiouan sense. 
Nasser, as spearheading nationalism, was 
embodied in the figure of the soldier. In 
this case, Nasser was literally a soldier 
before the 1952 events. In its symbolic 
importance, Nasser represented the hero 
that would free Egyptians from colonial-
ism and lead them to independence. The 
political project was clearly that of national 
independence accompanied by the hero 
figure: Nasser in the role of the zaiim, the 
leader, with nationalism as an ideology. 
Though Baradei never became President 
of Egypt, and despite the fact that many 
have been critical of the leadership model 
he proposed, the point of comparison is 
rather the symbolic representation of 
Baradei, along with Aboul Fotouh, to high-
light the different character of the 2011 
revolution. In comparison to Nasser, 
Baradei was more of a leading figure rep-
resented in the democratic practice of 
competing in elections, similar to that of 
Aboul Fotouh, than a hero figure that rep-
resented something new as such. 
Conclusion
In absence of the hero figure and an ideol-
ogy, revolutionary politics today in Egypt 
has diverged from its old historical drive, 
which was conditioned with wars and 
independence movements to bring about 
change through a leader and an ideology. 
Nasser’s popularity in Egypt, for example, 
is directly connected with his national 
project of forming the independent nation 
state and the historical situation of colo-
nialism. The desire for independence at 
that time was thus the historical condition 
that made the ideology of nationalism in 
the hero figure of Nasser a possibility. 
However, in the absence of wars – the last 
one in Egypt was in 1973 – this condition is 
lacking from revolutionary youth’s experi-
ences. In turn, they do not see the rele-
vance of a hero figure. Since Nasser, Egypt 
has been governed by the military through 
authoritarian rule and never translated the 
country’s independence movement into 
greater social justice and more emancipa-
tory politics. It resulted instead in succes-
sive dictatorial rule. Thus, the challenge for 
youth today is, as Badiou emphatically 
writes, “in disoriented times, we cannot 
accept the return of the old, deadly figures 
of religious sacrifice,6 but neither can we 
accept the complete lack of any figure, 
and the complete disappearance of any 
idea of heroism” (Badiou 33). 
Placing youth within the intervallic period—
that is, a time in which neither traditional 
politics based on leadership and ideology 
are appealing, nor is politics yet driven by 
a new idea or ideology that could super-
sede previous pitfalls of revolutionary 
movements, such as the dictatorship of 
one leader—leaderless and cross-ideolog-
ical mobilization strategies suggest a 
meaningful form of representing revolu-
tionary youth in Egypt. These mobilization 
strategies are not simply a choice or a tac-
tic used to mobilize others, but are a 
reflection of youth’s experiences during 
this particular historical juncture. These 
mobilization strategies promise new pos-
sibilities of practicing politics superseding 
the possibility of dictatorship of one 
leader and one ideology for all, in as far as 
they allow for a collective body to unite in 
their diversity aiming for greater social jus-
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tice and a fairer representation of the dif-
ferent segments of society (religious affili-
ation, gender, class, and so on). Yet as 
these mobilization strategies are not yet 
substantiated within an idea or a represen-
tative form of organization allowing for 
new possibilities of collective action and 
interaction, they remain a site and means 
of continued struggle.
Dina El-Sharnouby 
is a Post-doctoral fellow of the DRS 
HONORS at the Center for Middle 
Eastern and North African Politics, 
Free University Berlin (FU). She holds 
a PhD from the department of Political 
Science from FU. Her PhD asks ‘What 
is the meaning of the 2011 revolution 
to Egyptian youth and particularly 
to members in the leftist Bread and 
Freedom party?, During her PhD she was 
affiliated with the Berlin Graduate School 
Muslim Cultures and Societies. Before 
her PhD, El-Sharnouby obtained her 
Bachelors and Masters in Anthropology 
and Sociology from the American 
University in Cairo (AUC). El-Sharnouby 
has taught as an adjunct instructor at AUC 
and more recently assisted in teaching 
a course on the Arab revolutions at the 
Free University Berlin. She has published 
in form of a journal article, book chapter, 
and occasionally writes opinion pieces 
in English for Open Democracy and in 
German for Die Zeit.
email: El-Sharnouby@bgsmcs.fu-berlin.de
FOCUS
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #09–2017
95
Notes
1 Emphasis in original text
2 Emphasis in original text
3 For a detailed Case Study 
of my research go to: El 
Sharnouby, Dina “Con-
ducting Participant Action 
Research in the Context of 
Drastic Change: Understan-
ding Youth’s Political Project 
in Revolutionary Egypt” SAGE 
Research Methods Cases 
(2018)
4 Alain Badiou understands 
the Egyptian revolution as 
a historical riot; that is, as a 
break in time that allowed for 
new possibilities
5 All names of my inter-
locutors are replaced by 
pseudonyms to protect their 
identities
6 Badiou does not mean 
religious sacrifice literally in 
terms of religion but rather 
hints at the idea of militant-
ly abiding by a particular 
doctrine. 
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